from 1973 to 1989, it undertook a tremendous amount of trade liberalization on a unilateral basis and, by the late 1980s, had the strongest economic performance record in the region. With the resumption of democracy in 1990, the government looked for ways to reintegrate the country with its neighbors and began to sign bilateral and plurilateral agreements. These were not particularly important in economic terms in the short run, but they did have some interesting potential in terms of Chile's long-term strategy. The attempt to legally bind its neighbors into more liberal policies may have been a collateral goal. The agreements with the United States and Europe had defensive economic aims in the sense of locking in major markets to avoid future trade diversion. The Asian agreements were aggressive steps to try to get ahead of potential rivals and, perhaps, to obtain political recognition as a "first mover." In all of the non-Latin American partnerships, the desire to attract foreign investment has been at least as important as the interest in trade. Chile would like to be a hub for foreign investment in Latin America, but mainly to obtain the economic benefits. It is a very pragmatic country.
A Brief History of Chilean Trade Policy and the Role of PTAs
The history of Chilean trade policy can be divided into three phases, as seen in Figure 1 . The first represents the phase of unilateral opening . The second is the phase of preferential trade agreements with neighboring Latin American countries (1990s). The third is the phase of preferential agreements with non-Latin American regions (2000s). This schematic is an oversimplification since additional unilateral liberalization also occurred after 1990, but the main emphasis changed toward negotiated opening. In addition, it should be noted that the dates reflect when the agreements went into effect. Negotiations for the some of the non-Latin American PTAs were begun much earlier, while some are ongoing with Latin America as well as Asia.
At the time of the military coup against President Salvador Allende in September 1973,
Chile had a typical Latin American closed economy where the state played a major role. Indeed, it was an extreme example after the three years in which Allende's Popular Unity coalition tried to move toward socialism. In the trade sphere, average tariffs were around 100 percent and sometimes exceeded 200 percent. They were reinforced by other policies, such as quantitative restrictions, multiple exchange rates, and capital controls. Exports relied heavily on copper, and trade represented less than 30 percent of GDP.
Phase 1: Liberalizing trade, then, was one of the main reforms that the new economic team put into place, and they did it in a very dramatic way. Quantitative restrictions were quickly eliminated, and the government announced a gradual reduction of tariffs to a maximum of 60 percent for 1977. This goal was superseded, however, by the announcement of a 10-35 percent rate for 1978. Finally, tariffs were set at a uniform rate of 10 percent in 1979. While exchange rate policy was supposed to compensate for the rapidly falling tariffs, a real appreciation set in after an initial devaluation, as shown in Figure 1 . In 1979, the rate was pegged against the dollar.
Not surprisingly, the trade deficit burgeoned.
The trade deficit, together with financial imbalances and international shocks, led to a serious balance-of-payments crisis in the early 1980s. In addition to devaluing the currency, the flat tariff rate was raised to 35 percent for a brief period of time with even higher rates for a few individual products. Unlike some of its neighbors, the Chilean military survived the crisis, a more pragmatic economic team was installed, and tariffs were again lowered to reach a uniform 15 percent rate by 1988. The impact of these various changes on exports was predictable. After Phase 2: A democratic government returned to Chile in 1990. To the surprise of many, the basic elements of the earlier reforms, including the trade liberalization, were maintained and even deepened. Thus, in 1991 tariffs were reduced across the board from 15 to 11 percent, and in 1998 the Congress approved a further five-point reduction over a five-year period. At the same time, important adjustments were made both to domestic and international policies. With respect to the latter, one of the most controversial changes was the decision to initiate negotiations for a set of preferential trade agreements (Silva, 2004) This change came about for several reasons as the new government looked at the world in 1990. First, it was becoming clear that international trade was going to be a key driver of economic growth. Second, at the same time, the multilateral trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round were not going very well. Third, partly as a consequence, both the United States and Europe were looking toward bilateral or plurilateral agreements to improve their trade access. In the light of this scenario, the question for the Chilean government was now to best move forward with the export model developed in the previous years.
The Alywin administration (1990-94) argued that unilateral liberalization and preferential trade agreements are complements, not substitutes. Two main economic roles would be fulfilled by PTAs. First, they would bring about some amount of opening on the part of trade partners. By definition, unilateral liberalization affects only the policies of the country itself, and while it may make exports more competitive, it does not open markets. Second, they would lower transaction costs by providing rules to increase stability, promote transparency, and ensure fulfillment of commitments. In principle, multilateral agreements would serve these functions better than bilateral PTAs, but the length of time taken by these negotiations and the compromises required to obtain support for treaties led many countries to seek alternatives (Sáez and Valdés, 1999) . In addition to these economic motives for beginning to negotiate preferential agreements, political motives were at least as important. They included the reintegration of Chile into the regional and international system, international recognition of Chile as an important player, and support for governments with a similar political-economic stance.
Mainstream economists and the right-wing political opposition in Chile opposed the new policy initiative, seeing bilateralism as a distinct second-best to unilateral liberalization. They pointed out that the effect of signing a number of bilateral agreements would be to replace the uniform tariff with a range of differentiated rates. They were also concerned that bilateral agreements would reduce the likelihood of multilateral liberalization through the GATT/WTO. This opposition was overcome, in part, by continuing the unilateral tariff reduction at the same time the PTAs were being negotiated (Sáez and Valdés, 1999) .
Given the decision to expand Chile's trade policy instruments to include preferential agreements, the question was with whom to negotiate. Table 1 shows the list of Chilean trade agreements through 2007 and some characteristics of each. The first partners were in Latin America although, as will be explained later, disagreement existed within the government on whether Latin America should have been at the head of the queue. Nonetheless, agreements were signed with ten Latin American countries between 1992 and 1998. They included Mexico in 1992, Bolivia and Venezuela in 1993 , Colombia in 1994 , Ecuador in 1995 Eventually, a compromise was reached that allowed both sides to save face (Hornbeck, 2003; Rosales, 2003) .
Most relevant for this book are the trade agreements negotiated with Asian economies.
Thus far, Chile has signed agreements with seven Asian countries (Korea, Singapore, New
Zealand, Brunei, China, India, and Japan). Three others are under active negotiation (Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand), and several others are under discussion. With the exception of the China and India treaties, all are broad, detailed agreements of the FTA type. The terms with respect to goods were broad; investment and services were also included although with exceptions. The next Asian accord was signed in mid-2005 by the so-called P-4
group, which was constituted by four small economies: Chile, Singapore, New Zealand, and
Brunei. Not surprisingly, this was one of Chile's most complete agreements since both Singapore 4 EU website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/chile/index_en.htm (accessed 11/29/07). 5 Stoler (2006) discusses the concept of "high-quality" agreements in the Asian context. He reports that APEC members have developed best-practice guidelines. These include WTO consistency (substantially all trade barriers removed within reasonable period as well as comprehensiveness). Other criteria deal with WTO Plus commitments: transparency, trade facilitation, simplified rules of origin, cooperation, sustainable development, and accession by third parties.
and New Zealand have very open economies. The coverage was broad, and specific reference was made to the agreement as a model for free trade in the Asian region (Stoler, 2006) . It also has an accession clause so that others can join.
The agreements with China (2005) and especially India (2006) were less inclusive. Both were limited to goods, although the China treaty anticipated future negotiations on services and investment; a technical agreement has already been reached. The China agreement provided immediate duty-free entry for the vast majority of Chile's exports, but some of the most interesting for Chile (fruits and fish) were put on the 10-year list. A dispute mechanism was included together intellectual property and various social topics. The India agreement was much more limited, involving reduction in average tariffs of between 10 and 50 percent on a list of products (Rosales and Kuwayama, 2007) .
The final Asian agreement has been concluded with Japan, which was Chile's initial trade and investment partner across the Pacific. While the agreement was broad -including services, public purchasing, and phytosanitary measures -the trade access measures favored Japan more than Chile. More than 70 percent of Chilean exports will enter duty-free immediately, but over 90 percent of Japanese exports will get immediate access. In signing the agreement, the Chilean government emphasized the importance of the Asian accords for Chile's role as an intermediary between the two regions.
Explanations for Chilean PTAs
This book aims to "test" three hypotheses that might explain a country's PTA strategyindependent decision making (the null hypothesis), emulation of leading countries, or competition of economic, political, and/or legal types. The argument here is that Chile does not fit neatly into any of the three. Perhaps not surprisingly, since the country has been signing PTAs for nearly two decades, there have been shifts in motivation over time and among partners, and the agreements have included aspects of all three hypothesized models. Latin American nation that was not a member of a sub-regional group. It was also the country in the hemisphere, which -together with Chile -had made the most progress in market-based economic reforms, especially under the government of Carlos Salinas (1988 Salinas ( -1994 . Moreover, Mexico was negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States, and a deal with Mexico could improve Chile's own chances. 7 While the Chilean business sector expressed doubts about the benefits of the proposed agreement, the will of the two presidents prevailed. An Economic
Complementation Agreement between the two countries was signed in September 1991 and took effect in January 1992; it was upgraded to an FTA in 1998.
The next countries that Chile approached were its former partners in the Andean Community: Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. These countries were small in economic terms, together accounting for only 3 percent of Chilean exports. Nor was there much likelihood of their becoming major partners in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, all had reformist governments in the early 1990s, and agreements with them could help reinforce their inclinations in this policy direction. They would also indicate that Chile wanted to return to the neighborhood after its absence during the period of military rule, which included its exit from the Andean integration group because of the latter's protectionist policies. And, perhaps most importantly from the point of view of the Foreign Ministry, agreements would help to resolve old political disputes and resentments. As in the case of Mexico, the business community was not enthusiastic about the Andean agreements, arguing that they did not bring much economic benefit. At the same time, the Bolivian negotiation process witnessed an important fissure among business groups. To appease the traditional agricultural sector in Chile, a narrow agreement was concluded that excluded their most sensitive products, while the industrialists thought only a broad agreement was worthwhile. ECAs with these four countries were signed in 1993 and 1994, but the internal disagreements in Chile lingered on. A few years later, Chile signed an agreement with Peru, the other Andean Community member and Chile's largest trade partner in the group.
Similar business sentiment emerged, opposing agreements that were seen as more political than economic, but the government prevailed (Porras, 2003 however, it agreed to become an associate member.
The internal dynamic in Chile leading up to the association agreement was different than occurred with most of the other agreements that Chile signed before (and afterwards) since civil society groups played an especially active role. Indeed, the Mercosur agreement was perhaps the most controversial that Chile has ever signed. Government arguments in favor of accession mainly stressed the economic reasons for the deal, both proactive (long-term prospects for trade and investment in a large market) and defensive (Mercosur's threat to end existing preferences that were important for neighboring Chile). These views were shared by the industrial sector, which saw Argentina and Brazil as a significant market. Moreover, these two countries were the recipients of a large part of the new Chilean investments abroad. The traditional agriculture sector, however, felt extremely threatened since the Mercosur countries were among the world's most efficient producers of wheat, sugar, and vegetable oils, which were also their main products. The agriculturalists, and their association the National Agricultural Association (SNA, by its Spanish acronym), joined forces with politicians representing their districts and threatened to defeat the government's proposal. Only when the government promised payments to the affected groups, amounting to 3 percent of the 1999 budget, was the agreement was approved (Stefoni and Fuentes, 1998; Aninat, Londregan, Navia, and Vial, 2004) .
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In summary, Chile's early trade agreements were with its regional neighbors. The explanations were mainly political: a way of reintegrating with the region and helping to damp down old quarrels. Even if the dominant explanation for these early agreements was political, however, several economic factors should also be noted. First, Chile, like other Latin American countries, exports higher value-added goods to the region than to most of its partners in the industrial countries. Thus, the reciprocal lowering of protection in the Latin American markets opened the way for these higher-quality exports, which could later be exported elsewhere.
Second, Chile has engaged in significant outward investment, and almost all of that has been within Latin America. While the ECA arrangements did not deal with investment, in some cases they paved the way for broader modified agreements. Finally, Chile aims to become an investment hub, especially for FDI from Asia, and the regional agreements will be crucial in this regard, especially the one with Mercosur as Latin America's biggest market.
U.S. and European PTAs: If Chile's early trade agreements with its Latin American
neighbors were independent decisions mainly designed to boost foreign policy goals, the next group of agreements centered on competition dynamics but had aspects of emulation as well.
These agreements returned to the path that the Finance Ministry had wanted to follow earlier in negotiating with countries that were Chile's main economic partners and where it was thought that market access needed to be safeguarded from potential rivals. But, in addition, these were also political and ideological partners that Chile admired and wanted to be associated with. The United States and Western Europe were the world's leading democracies, and they were also the world's most developed economies. Being associated with them in trade agreements would enhance Chile's reputation in ways that went beyond purely economic gains.
Virtually all analyses of Chilean trade policy emphasize the national consensus that Chile has done well as a trader and must continue down this path. There is also general agreement that the country must deepen its export strategy by expanding the quantity of its sales abroad, raising their quality in terms of value added, and trying to link exports more closely to GDP growth. A look at Table 2 , which compares Chile and its main trading partners on a number of characteristics, provides some understanding of the support for export-led growth. It reveals that
Chile stands out in only two ways: its small size, both in population and aggregate GDP, and the importance of exports as a source of demand. Thus, once its immediate political requirements in the region had been taken care of through the preferential agreements discussed above, the government turned more specifically to its economic requirements.
As of the year 2000, Chile's eight largest markets, comprising 75 percent of total exports, included the European Union (24 percent), the United States (17), Japan (13), China (5) Chile's trade goals in the U.S. and EU agreements were mainly defensive -to safeguard access to its largest markets and to prevent others getting better access through preferential arrangements. With respect to the United States, Mexico -and potentially Central America and the Caribbean -were of concern to Chile, especially in terms of the industrial goods that Chile hoped to emphasize in the future. Chile's natural resource exports already entered the United States with very low tariffs, but the policy of tariff escalation for goods with higher value added made it difficult to compete in the industrial sector. Mexico had already become a member of NAFTA, which guaranteed its access to U.S. markets, and it was possible that its smaller neighbors would also sign agreements with the United States. In the case of the EU, the main concern was with respect to the former Soviet bloc countries, many of which had become candidates for EU membership. Chile hoped to expand its traditional political links with Europe into a stronger economic partnership.
If Chile's trade goals were mainly defensive, its investment goals had a more proactive character. Chile wanted to gain access to foreign direct investment from the United States and Europe to upgrade its exports, but it also wanted to become the investment hub for South
America by promoting itself as the most reliable partner in the region. Through the combination, 10 Chilean officials still remember their failure to capture a big investment by Intel in the 1990s, which ultimately went to Costa Rica and transformed the industrial and trade structure of that country. They are determined not to repeat this experience.
the government hoped that it could recover and maintain the high growth rate it had enjoyed from the late 1980s. Indeed, from 1985 to 1997, Chile had had a nearly-Asian rate of growth (an annual average of 7.4 percent), but it fell off at the end of the 1990s as a spillover from the Asian financial crisis. Recovery of that growth rate was important for social and political as well as economic reasons.
Both the U.S. and European agreements had long gestations. As already noted, a U.S.
agreement was on the agenda from 1990. The European agreement also dated from that same period through the signing in 1990 of a framework agreement (acuerdo marco). While this framework agreement involved many social and political topics, its trade relevance was limited and the possibilities of making progress did not seem very auspicious. Moreover, the main business opinions about the EU were initially negative, in the form of traditional agriculture and its representative, the SNA. The industrialists were not interested since almost no industrial exports were sold in Europe. Over time, however, the latter opinion began to change, especially as the possibility of a deal with the United States seemed more distant. When Europe itself became more interested in Latin America at the end of the decade, Chile stood out as a likely partner despite the fact that the EU preferred to negotiate with other blocs rather than individual countries. With the executive branch pushing hard, little opposition was found in Chile, except from the wine and fishing sectors where the Europeans made stringent demands. A compromise was reached over the former, and the latter was unable to arouse support for its complaint, so that an "Agreement of Political and Economic Association" was signed in May of 2002.
Perhaps stimulated by the closer relations between Chile and the EU, the outgoing Clinton administration suddenly invited Chile to begin negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement in January 2001. Once underway, the process was relatively straight forward since it closely followed the format and content of the Chile-Canada and (updated) Chile-Mexico agreements as well as that of NAFTA itself. The main sticking point was the labor and environmental agreements, which had to be incorporated into the agreement itself given the political situation in the United States. This prospect aroused a good deal of opposition in Chile, but was eventually seen as a small price to pay. In addition, the traditional opposition from the agricultural sector was muted since the SNA had been taken over by the large farming interests who would stand to benefit enormously from a U.S. agreement. It was signed in June 2003 and went into effect in January 2004.
Asian PTAs: The place where Chile really displayed an aggressive competitive spiritcompetitive with respect to the rest of Latin America and some other developing countries -was in Asia. This was a deliberate strategy that dated back more than two decades. The earliest steps
were Chilean attempts to break into the Japanese market, by far the most important in the region at that time. In the 1980s, Chile devoted enormous efforts to sell its fruit, other agricultural products, and wine in Japan. With the help of the Japanese trading companies (soga shosha), this was eventually accomplished. The Japanese greatly admired the persistence shown and became good customers. In some years in the 1990s, Japan actually surpassed the United States as the top destination of Chilean exports. It also began to invest in Chile in modest amounts (Saavedra, 1993) .
Using Japan as a base, and developing serious diplomatic capacity in Asian affairs, Chile expanded its contacts into many Asian countries through its embassies and its export promotion office, Prochile. Prochile's job was to help potential exporters, including smaller firms, to move into Asia (and other regions). As an indicator of its Asian vocation, in 1994 Chile became the second Latin American country to become a member of APEC, following the accession of
Mexico the previous year. The Chilean government also continued to hone the skills of its negotiators. Indeed, if reports are to be believed, Korea decided to negotiate Asia's first crossregional FTA in order to learn from the Chileans how to negotiate (Koo, 2006) .
Korea was Chile's first Asian PTA partner; negotiations began at the former's request.
Both sides were enthusiastic because it appeared that their economies were complementary, and each was eager to get a foothold in the other's region. Negotiations began late in December 1999, but stalled the following year and did not resume actively for three more years. In this case, unlike others in which Chile was involved, it was Korean farmers who felt threatened while Korean industrialists were eager for an agreement since they were being displaced in the Chilean market. On the Chilean side, the pattern was the opposite: fruit producers were enthusiastic while industrialists, especially in the household appliances sector, were very leery. The compromise was that apples and pears were excluded on Korea's side in return for protection for Chilean refrigerators and washing machines. In addition, to get the agreement ratified in Korea, their government had to promise up to $80 billion in compensation if the Korean agriculture sector was damaged (Park and Koo, 2007) .
In rapid fashion, other Asian agreements followed. The next after Korea was with three smaller economies (Singapore, New Zealand, and Brunei), then with gigantic China and India, and finally with its long-time partner, Japan. Negotiations are underway with Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand, and some others are under discussion. This record greatly increased
Chile's international prestige and, in particular, its reputation in Asia. While it helped to open markets, the goal was larger and more strategic. The Foreign Minister, when signing the Japan agreement, made this clear. "We began explorations in Asia some years ago. We dared to enter an extraordinarily large, diversified market, and with the implementation of the free trade agreement today -added to the accords that Chile already has with the People's Republic of China, South Korea, India and the countries of the P-4, as well as the network of treaties with other South American countries -Chile is becoming a platform for connection in the Pacific
Rim" (Fischer, 2007) . In the last few years, however, political competition between the two largest countries in the hemisphere -the United States and Brazil -began to derail the project. More recently, the election of a number of governments openly opposed to the FTAA seems to have ended it, at least for the foreseeable future. This leaves a set of bilateral agreements with very different terms, as well as competing plurilateral groups that have different goals as well as different economic structures and terms. Without an FTAA to bring them together, the outlook for a robust regional integration in Latin America seems more distant than ever.
Impact of Chilean PTAs

Conclusions
As this paper has amply demonstrated, Chile has conducted a very active trade policy over the past 35 years. Initially this policy was based exclusively on unilateral and multilateral mechanisms. In the 1990s, however, the Chilean government began one of the world's most intensive processes of negotiating preferential agreements -although it also continued to lower tariff rates on a unilateral basis and to participate in multilateral negotiations. The period since 1990 can, in turn, be divided into two sub-periods. During the first period, Chile concentrated on negotiations with its Latin American neighbors, mostly for political reasons. During the second period, Chile turned to negotiate with its largest markets: the United States, Europe, and Asia. In these latter cases, the motives have been mainly economic. Currently, 87 percent of Chilean trade is carried out under preferential arrangements, but the benefits still remain to be seen.
What can be said at this point about the three hypotheses -independent decision making, emulation, or competition -for explaining preferential agreements that the chapter is supposed to be testing? It was argued earlier that all three have been in play at different points in Chile's history of PTAs. The early period of economic complementation agreements in the Latin
American region was an example of independent, state-led action geared mainly to achieve foreign policy goals. Insofar as economic aims were also involved in these agreements, they were elements of a future international strategy, not in competition with anything that had already been done in the region. The agreements with the larger economies, by contrast, did seem to be motivated by competition, both to lock in access to export markets in light of present and possible future competitors, but especially for foreign direct investment to play a key role in
Chile's own investment strategy and to further its aim to be an investment hub for South America. At the same time, it is possible to argue that some elements of an emulation process were also involved in the negotiations with the United States and Europe. As bulwarks of democracy as well as economic success, these countries were ones that Chile identified with and wanted to follow.
Looking at the indicators that were outlined in the introductory chapter for the competition versus the emulation models does not provide much help in distinguishing motives in the Chilean case. Emulation is supposed to involve as many agreements as possible and with relatively similar terms. Chile fits both of these characteristics. On the other hand, initiative by the government as opposed to "epistemic communities" is supposed to be related to competitive strategies. This characterization fits the Chilean case too, as does the outcome of fragmented regionalism. Perhaps it is the indicators themselves that are confusing, not really giving us a good handle on the differences between competition versus emulation or of independent decision making as an alternative. what it sought and was willing to accept. During the previous decade and a half of unilateral liberalization, the costs of resource reallocation had already been paid, and a relatively efficient, export-oriented production sector had resulted.
Third, preferential agreements should be seen as complements to, not substitutes for, unilateral and multilateral policies. All have something to offer in terms of a country's position in the international system. Preferential agreements are often said to be second-best, but they should not be eschewed for this reason. Of course, care must be taken in the way such agreements are negotiated to avoid the "spaghetti bowl" or "noodle bowl" effects; Chile could do better on this count.
Fourth, a successful preferential initiative requires strong institutional support. Expertise about potential partners is very important, and foreign ministries have to modernize themselves on this dimension and with respect to economics in general. Negotiators need to be well trained, and other government agents (such as export promotion agencies) also need to play a part.
Fifth, it is crucial to recognize that trade is not an isolated part of the economy. Chile has done an excellent job in managing its macroeconomic balances, including a number of financial and fiscal innovations. It has done less well with respect to microeconomics. While some of its large firms are extremely efficient, many firms are still not well positioned for international competition. The government is aware of these problems, but it needs to put more effort into remedying them if Chile is to realize the full potential of its international trade accomplishments (see Mesquita Moreira and Blyde, 2006 
